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The Tribunal found that the main issues for determination in this matter were 1) whether a temporary job opening limited to “local recruitment only” is lawful, and 2) if the Applicant’s candidature was given full and fair consideration. On the first issue, the Tribunal found that the Respondent’s argument that pursuant to section 1.1 of ST/AI/2010/4 Rev.1 (Administration of temporary appointments) the Organization may limit temporary job openings to local recruitment cannot stand. It also found that there were no legal grounds for the Respondent’s assertion that limiting temporary recruitments to locally based candidates is a “vested right”, and that explicitly limiting applications to temporary job openings at the professional level to local staff makes geographical location of a candidate the paramount consideration, which is contrary the Charter and the applicable rules. Finally, the Tribunal also concluded that considerations of time and budgetary constraints cannot override the existing rule of law within the Organization. Consequently, the Tribunal found it unlawful to use geographical location of candidates as an eliminatory eligibility criterion for temporary openings at the professional level, as was the case for the temporary job opening at stake. On the second issue, the Tribunal found that limiting a temporary job opening at the professional level to local recruitment is illegal, and that the application of an unlawful “eligibility criterion” prevented the Applicant from moving to the short list of candidates. It also found that the Respondent failed to minimally show that the Applicant was given full and fair consideration during the selection exercise and thus concluded that the Applicant’s candidacy was not afforded full and fair consideration and that the contested decision had to be rescinded. Remedies Considering inter alia the limited duration of the advertised temporary position, and compensation in lieu generally awarded in cases of non-promotion/selection, the Tribunal found it appropriate to set the amount of alternative compensation in lieu of rescission at USD3,000. The Applicant did not submit or suggest any evidence in respect of moral damages but only asserted in his application that he had suffered morally. Whilst the Tribunal appreciated the position of the Applicant, it found that a mere assertion in the application is not sufficient and that it is bound to act only on the evidence before it. The Tribunal concluded that it was not in a position to make an award in respect of the moral damage asserted by the Applicant.